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Notes
VICARIOUS LIABILITY-A LIMITED
APPLICATION OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
TO POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING
Although respondeat superior,the doctrineunder which liability is imposed upon
an employerfor the acts of his employee committed within the scope ofhis employment, isfirrmly entrenchedin our legalsystem, it has had little, if any, impact in the
context of/apoliticalcampaign In orderto determinethe extent to which apolitical
candidatemay be held vicariously liableforthe tortious conduct ofa volunteer campaign worker, this Note analyzes the elements of the doctrine at common law in
conjyunction with the competingpolicy considerationswhich couldaffect extension of
vicarious liability to the electoralprocess. Recognizing potentialfirst amendment
restrictionsupon such an extension, the authorconcludes by suggestingseveraltypes
of tortious conduct to which, within theframework of apoliticalcampaign, liability
should attach under respondeat superior.
INTRODUCTION

is generally recognized as a basic principle governing liability in enterprise organizations. 1 Over time,
the doctrine has been consistently expanded to cover new areas of
human interaction which may result in injury to third parties.2
Yet there remains one area in which the doctrine has had little or
no impact: political campaigning.
Although there are few cases advocating the extension of vicarious liability into the political arena, 3 the issue is, nevertheless,
ripe. The dimension of modem campaigning invites more wideRPONDEAT SUPERIOR

1. Interpreted literally from Latin, respondeat superior means "let the master answer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (4th ed. 1968). The phrase commonly stands for

the proposition that "the master is liable for the torts of his servant, committed in the
course of employment." F. MECHEM, OUTLINES oF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 349 (4th ed.
1952).
2. F. MECHEM, supra note 1.

3. As early as 1913, a Wisconsin court imposed personal liability on the treasurer and
other members of a campaign committee for a contract which was made in the name of the
campaign chairman. Vader v. Ballou, 151 Wis. 577, 139 N.W. 413 (1913). The court based
its holding on evidence which showed that the treasurer was aware of the contract and had
made part payment for it out of committee funds. In so doing, reasoned the court, the
treasurer, and, implicitly, the entire committee, had ratified the chairman's conduct. Id.
Similarly, in United States v. Finance Comm. to Re-Elect the President, 507 F.2d 1194
(D.C. Cir. 1974), the court imputed knowledge of a contribution illegally obtained by a
committee chairman to the entire committee. The court said that the committee clearly
knew that it had a legal duty to report each contribution but had not done so. Id. at 1198.
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spread contact with the public with a corresponding increased potential for injury to third parties. For instance, some negligent as
well as intentional physical harm may be produced by volunteer
workers maneuvering through a crowd at a political rally. Heated
political debates and the occasional excess of zeal generated by a
political campaign may transform a volunteer campaign worker
into an agent of harm. Equally apparent is a campaign worker's
propensity toward violating local trespass laws, either by posting
signs and placards or by door-to-door canvassing of voters. Such
conduct may encompass newer torts as well, ranging from invasion of privacy arising out of unauthorized wiretapping and elec4
tronic eavesdropping to statutorily unethical campaign conduct.
Despite the tendency of modem political campaigning to result in diverse forms of harm, several arguments against the extension of respondeat superior to the campaign context have been
advanced. Foremost among them is the fact that a political campaign is vastly different from the traditional areas to which the
doctrine has been applied. For example, a campaign organization
is necessarily temporary. It may be composed in large part of untrained, voluntary, grassroots workers. Additionally, the campaign organization functions as a nonprofit political organization
the first amendment freedoms
which has traditionally exemplified
5
of speech and association.
Given these structural tensions, this Note analyzes whether political candidates, campaign committees, campaign officers, and
political parties should be vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of volunteer campaign workers. This analysis first focuses
upon the traditional justifications for application of vicarious liaof political
bility to determine the relevance of each in thetocontext
identify the legal
campaigning.6 Second, an attempt is made

capacity of campaign committees, campaign workers, and candidates to be sued for the torts of a campaign volunteer.7 Third,
using the traditional "scope of employment" analysis, this Note
seeks to determine to whom and under what circumstances respondeat stiperior may apply during the campaign process.8
4. Unethical campaign conduct includes the use of racially or ethnically derogatory
remarks in public criticism of an opponent, false claims about one's own qualifications, and
a wide variety of "dirty tricks." See text accompanying notes 134-39 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 125-39 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 12-31 ifra.
7. See text accompanying notes 35-62 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 63-93 infra.
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Fourth, attention is addressed to the potential constitutional limitations upon the application of vicarious liability to political campaigns. 9
This pattern of analysis concludes by identifying the conduct
to which vicarious liability should attach and suggesting a qualified application of respondeat superior to the enterprise of political campaigning. Such an approach should render campaign
organizations accountable to the public while preserving them as a
valued democratic institution.1"
I.

TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF
VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Despite widespread acceptance of vicarious liability over the
past 250 years, courts appear to be not wholly comfortable with

the notion of charging one person with the responsibility for the
wrongful actions of another solely on the basis of their employment relationship. 1 Consequently, courts consistently reexamine

liability before exthe traditional policy justifications for vicarious
12
tending the doctrine to new relationships.
A.

Competing Policy Considerations

Six justifications are generally recognized.

First, liability

should befall the employer' 3 for negligently selecting or supervising an employee who injured a third party.' 4 This theory does

not, however, justify the imposition of vicarious liability; rather, it
directly, based on the negligence of the employer
imposes liability
himself. ' 5
9. See text accompanying notes 94-122 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 124-39 infra.
11. Virtually all scope of employment or frolic-and-detour cases stand as support for
the proposition that courts do not feel that an employment relationship alone suffices to
warrant vicarious liability for all harms precipitated by a servant. See, e.g., Grimes v. B.F.
Saul Co., 47 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 193 1); Herr v. Simplex Paper Box Co., 330 Pa. 129, 198 A.
309 (1938).
12. See, e.g., Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d 465, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958) (extending vicarious liability to a gratuitous master-servant relationship); Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356,
232 P.2d 241 (1951) (applying respondeat superior to charitable institutions).
13. The terms "employer" and "employee" have, through usage, developed an imprecise connotation. For the purposes of this Note, however, the terms are used to encompass
the tort concept of master and servant and to exclude the notions of principal and agent
and contractual liability.
14. Wishone v. Yellow Cab Co., 20 Tenn. App. 229, 97 S.W.2d 452 (1936); Priest v.
F.W. Woolworth Five and Ten Cent Store, 228 Mo. App. 23, 62 S.W.2d 926 (1933).
15. Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915 (D.C. Ct. App. 1951).
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A second theory is that one employs a substitute at his own
peril.16 Any positive action necessarily involves a risk of harm to
a third party. One who initiates that action, either on his own or
by virtue of the employment of another, must take responsibility
for any resultant harm. 7
The third justification for the application of vicarious liability
developed as a response to evidentiary problems faced by the injured party who was generally unable to specify which employee
precipitated the injury and at whose direction."8 The doctrine of
vicarious liability removed this onerous burden from the injured
party.
The three justifications already discussed are, however, only
tangentially relevant to the policy considerations which underlie
the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. The ensuing three theories, based on notions of control, benefit, and
financial responsibility, are the more frequent justifications for the
imposition of vicarious liability.
The fourth theory emphasizes the employer's right to control
the actions of his employee, rather than the employer's actual opportunity to do so. Stated simply, because the employer is in the
best position to control the course of an employee's actions, the
injury to third parties when he
employer should bear the loss for
19
has failed to meet this burden.
Underlying this justification are notions of negligent hiring
and supervision. The threat of vicarious liability encourages an
employer to supervise his workers more carefully. This reasoning
is, of course, compelling only when the employer is in fact in the
best position to supervise the actions of his employees.
The fifth justification is premised on the notion that the employer establishes the venture to further his own interests. By so
doing he places the employee in a position which may result in
16. Carr v. William C. Crowell Co., 28 CaL 2d 652, 171 P.2d 5 (1946); Chase v. New

Haven Waste Material Corp., I11 Conn. 377, 150 A. 107 (1930).
17. See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1960) (hold-

ing defendant vicariously liable for the actions of its servant, an intoxicated sailor returning
from shore leave who tampered with the valves controlling a drydock near his ship, causing
substantial damage). It may be that this theory represents a combination of the benefit and
control arguments (see notes 19-20 infra and accompanying text) and operates merely as a
shorthand notation for these concepts.
18. Smith, Frolic andDetour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 455-56 (1923).

19. F. MECHEM, su.pra note 1, at § 352. See, eg., Arsand v. City of Franklin, 83 Wis.
2d 40, 264 N.W.2d 579 (1978); Van Drake v. Thomas, 110 Ind. App. 586, 38 N.E.2d 878
(1942).
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harm to a third party. Because the employer is deriving profits
and other benefits from the venture, he should absorb the loss if
harm results.20
The final justification is widely known as the "deep pocket"
theory. The argument is that vicarious liability should be applied
because employers, as a class, tend to be financially responsible
more often than employees, thus diminishing the chance that an
injured party's only recourse will be against a judgment-proof person.21 Two theories are usually considered in conjunction with
the deep pocket rationale. The first is enterprise liability, which is
based upon the notion that the enterprise which occasions the injury is in a better position to absorb such losses and insure against
them. 22 The second is risk allocation, an economic approach premised upon the theory that the price of a product should truly
reflect the costs associated with it. Including the cost of tort injuries in the price of a product will cause consumers
to pay in ac23
cordance with the product's true economic value.
Although none of these justifications alone provides an adequate basis for imposing vicarious liability on the employer, each
represents an important consideration which merits analysis in the
political campaign context. Perhaps a combination of these theories will create a sound foundation for redressing innocent third
parties injured in the course of a political campaign.
B. Relevance of the Justfcations in the Context of a Political
Campaign
At first glance, these justifications appear to apply directly to a
20. Note, Respondeat Superiorand the IntentionalTort: A Short DiscourseOn How To
Make Assault and Battery a Partof the Job, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 235, 252 (1976). See also
Dill v. Rader, 533 P.2d 650 (Okla. App. 1975) (applying the principle that the master will

be liable for the torts of his servants which occur while the servant is on duty or performing
an employment-related task).
In Panama R.R. v. Bosse, 249 U.S. 41 (1919), Justice Holmes supported this justifica-

tion by stating that "a master must be taken to foresee that sooner or later a servant driving
a motor will be likely to have a collision, which a jury may hold to have been due to his

negligence, whatever care has been used in the employment of the man." Id. at 46.
21. Smith, supra note 18, at 460.
22. F. MECHEM, supra note 1, at § 352; Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
23. Calabresi, supra note 22. In a business context, consumers who absorb the cost of
these losses or of improvements made to eliminate the losses have a substantial interest in
obtaining a safer product or in insuring against possible injury to themselves by absorbing

such costs as a group.
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campaign for elective office. For example, a candidate 24 may be
negligent in selecting and supervising his volunteer workers.25
Similarly, he may be in the same position as any other individual
who employs a substitute to accomplish his goals.26 It would seem
that applying vicarious liability to the campaign context would remove the burden on the injured third party to identify which employee created the harm.27
Although all three of these justifications are applicable to political campaigning, they are an inadequate foundation for the extension of vicarious liability to this area. Negligent selection and
supervision justifies liability but not vicarious liability since the
candidate himself would be negligent. Employing a substitute at
one's peril is conclusory; it fails to provide a justification without
incorporating the control and benefit arguments. Additionally,
concern for easing the injured party's burden of proof may be
laudable, but it is altogether too simplistic a justification because it
fails to take into consideration the employer's burden.
The control, benefit, and deep pocket theories appear to apply
to the campaign context in a superficial way as well. For example,
within the campaign structure the candidate occupies a position of
control similar to that of the employer.2 He has the capacity to
control campaign workers in carrying out their duties. The candidate also derives a benefit from his venture. Unlike the employer,
however, his immediate benefit is not in the form of monetary
profit but rather in the power of the office he is seeking.29 Finally,
the deep pocket or loss-spreading rationale might be advanced to
justify extending vicarious liability to the political candidate. The
24. The term "candidate" will be used to include the candidate, his campaign committee, or his staff as potential bearers of the costs of imposing vicarious liability.
25. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
26. See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
27. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. See also note 29 infra.
28. See text accompanying notes 67-69 infra. While it is impractical to expect candi-

dates to exercise control over the details of each worker's duties, the possibility of vicarious
liability may prove to be an effective incentive for the candidate, his committee, or his
campaign officers to ensure that greater controls are exercised. Due to the extensive traveling a candidate may do and the vast number of locations in which he might have workers
campaigning, it is unlikely that he would be in the best position to control the activities of
these workers. On the other hand, presidents of large businesses are in a similar position.
They exercise control through intermediaries. Cf MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 169.203(2)
(Supp. 1978) (stating, "A candidate committee shall be presumed to be under the control
and direction of the candidate. . .).
29. It is well established that profit is not essential to the imposition ofvicarious liability. E.g., Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d
465, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958).
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candidate's campaign fund, if not the candidate himself, is presumptively a more adequate source for satisfying losses of third
parties than is a volunteer worker. There is, however, no logical
reason to assume that the candidate's pockets are, in fact, sufficiently deep to satisfy third party claims. Additionally, since the
candidate is not engaged in a business with a product to sell,30 he
cannot effectively distribute these losses over a class of consumers
who buy his product. Even if contributors are equated with consumers, contributions do not flow to the candidate personally but
to his campaign treasury, which is controlled by his committee.
Although these theories seem to justify the application of respondeat superior in the campaign context, a mechanical application of the justifications is inadequate. Policy considerations and
the uniqueness of the campaign structure make the application
less certain. For instance, the candidate's right of control over
volunteer workers is questionable when compared to the employer's control over paid employees. The political candidate's
campaign organization is not precisely like an entrepreneur's association. The campaign structure is loose and of temporary duration. Campaign workers are chosen for their availability and
enthusiasm rather than for their skill. Generally, there is no sophisticated personnel department or screening procedures. Further, the desire for promotion and fear of a cut in salary which
operate as strong incentives for a hired worker to meet the demands of his employer may have little, if any, effect upon a volunteer. The "employer" of volunteers simply does not have the same
leverage to impose his will on subordinates as does the employer
of paid workers. On the other hand, he does have the unconditional right to terminate a volunteer as well as the right to control
the details of the volunteer's work, a factor which some courts
have considered sufficient to justify applying respondeat superior
to the employment relationship.32
It might also be argued that the candidate receives the benefit
30. The typical business has a concrete product to sell which consumers need and for
which they will spend money. The more abstract "product" a campaign is "selling" is not
an immediate need as is a television set or an automobile. Thus, it may not be fair or even

possible to pass along the cost of tort losses to the candidate. On the other hand, imposing
these costs would foster more realistic expenditures on the part of the campaign organization. The advent of public financing has caused the candidate's class of contributors to
expand to include his entire constituency rather than merely his political contributors.
Thus, the fact that the candidate has no tangible product to sell is less importanL

31. 2 U.S.C. § 432(b) (Supp. 1976).
32. E.g., Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951).
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of the campaign enterprise and thus should not escape the burdens. There is clearly a benefit even though it is not the typical
entrepreneurial profit.33 Benefit alone, however, cannot justify the
imposition of vicarious liability. This rationale alone proves too
much since liability would be justified for all injuries connected in
any way with the enterprise as long as the party being sued has
derived a benefit.3"
Assuming the justifications underlying respondeat superior are
applicable to the campaign context, the benefits obtained by the
injured third party must be weighed against the burdens imposed
upon both the freedoms of speech and association and the general
desirability of maintaining the campaign as the foundation of our
democratic government.
It is evident that the applicability of vicarious liability to political candidates is not easily resolved. Consequently, it is necessary to analyze the sufficiency of the justifications underlying the
doctrine in light of concepts such as the nature and scope of employment, the special nature of campaigning as an enterprise, and
the free exercise of the constitutionally protected rights of speech
and association.
II.

CAPACITY TO BE SUED

Preceding any inquiry into whether respondeat superior
should be extended to politicians and their campaign workers,
however, a preliminary question arises: is there a party with the
capacity to be sued?
A.

The Campaign Committee

Campaign committees are usually neither partnerships nor
corporate entities,3" but in United States v. Finance Committee to
33. E.g, Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 372-74, 232 P.2d 241, 251 (1951); Heims v.
Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d 465, 468, 93 N.W.2d 455, 458 (1958).

34. Smith, supra note 18. Dean Smith notes:
But one may derive profits from an undertaking and still not be responsible for
injuries to others resulting from the operations. This is best illustrated by the
cases holding that participation in the profits of a business does not necessarily
render one responsible as a partner. True it is that frequently the master does
receive part or all of the profits, but his liability for his servants' torts rests upon
something other than the mere fact that he receives the profits from the undertaking.
Id. at 456.

35. Although not recognized as legal entities, campaign organizations may still be
criminally accountable to the Federal Election Commission.
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Re-Elect the President,36 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held the committee liable for campaign violations pursuant to statutory authorization to do so.37 Other courts have
avoided the capacity to be sued problem by viewing campaign organizations as voluntary unincorporated associations.38
In general, unincorporated associations do not have the legal
capacity to sue or be sued absent a statute expressly establishing
their legal obligations and defining their rights and obligations.3 9

There are, however, certain exceptions to this general rule. Unincorporated associations have been sued, even in the absence of
such a statute, if the action is brought to enforce a right existing
under the Constitution or laws of the United States.' Thus, for
example, a campaign committee might be amenable to suit, without the aid of a state statute, if it were accused by an individual of
violating his right to privacy due to an illegal wiretap.41
I Second, an unincorporated association may be sued as part of
a class action. 42 A class of Republican voters might, for instance,
sue a Democratic opponent who had fraudulently induced the Republican candidate to travel to the wrong location causing him to
miss an important speaking engagement.
Third, unincorporated associations may be sued in actions
brought in equity. Thus, a suit for specific performance on a contract would stand. 43 Further, a campaign committee might be
amenable to suit in tort if a candidate were invoking the court's
equity jurisdiction to enjoin his opponent's campaign activities
36.
37.
38.
39.

507 F.2d 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-51 (1971).
E.g., Vader v. Ballou, 151 Wis. 2d 577, 139 N.W. 413 (1913).
Labor unions, for example, have no legal capacity to sue or be sued in absence of

express statutory language. See, ag., Zane v. International Hod Carriers Bldg. and Common Laborers' Union, 155 Kan. 87, 122 P.2d 715 (1942); Cousin v. Taylor, 115 Or. 472,239
P. 96 (1925); Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 380 Pa. 3, 109 A.2d 815 (1954).
40. Eg., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 186-87 (8th Cir. 1948),
interpreting FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(1) as permitting an unincorporated association to be
sued even in the absence of a state statute defining its legal status.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1976) (federal wiretap provision).
42. Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Flieman and Enginemen, 148 F.2d 403

(4th Cir. 1945), holding that an unincorporated association may be sued pursuant to FED.
R. Civ. P. 23, even in the absence of state statutory provision establishing the capacity of

unincorporated associations to sue or be sued. In this case, the defendant unincorporated
labor union was sued as a representative of the defendant class in a labor discrimination

action.
43. Eg., Zane v. International Hod Carriers Bldg. & Common Laborers' Union, 155
Kan. 87, 122 P.2d 715 (1942), indicating that unincorporated associations might be sued on
equitable claims.
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under a cause of action similar to an unfair competition theory."
A fourth exception allows unincorporated associations to be
sued if policy reasons so dictate. Thus, in considering the capacity
of a large unincorporated labor union to be sued, the Supreme
Court stated:
It would be unfortunate if an organization with as great power
as this International Union has in the raising of large funds and
in directing the conduct of four hundred thousand members in
carrying on, in a wide territory, industrial controversies and
strikes, out of which so much unlawful injury to private rights
is possible, could assemble its assets to be used therein free
from liability for injuries by torts committed in the course of
such strikes.45
Clearly, the analogy between large labor unions and campaign
committees is imperfect. Campaign committees are not as large,
as permanent, or probably as powerful as giant labor unions. On
the other hand, campaign committees are capable of organizing
hundreds or even thousands of workers and of utilizing potentially huge campaign funds to attain its goals. Inevitably, in the
course of pursuing these goals, unlawful injury may result, and the
campaign should not be insulated from liability.
Finally, an unincorporated association may be sued, absent a
statute, in certain instances of misrepresentation. It has been held
that an unincorporated association is estopped to deny its existence as a legal entity.46 When the plaintiff has relied upon the
association's misrepresentations to his detriment, it is evident in
light of these precedents that a campaign committee could be sued
on a theory of respondeat superior, either under statutory grant or
under one of the exceptions to the general rule governing voluntary unincorporated associations.
B.

Campaign Workers: "Members" ofan Association?

Many jurisdictions have enacted statutes which prohibit judgments against unincorporated associations from being executed
44. Examples include an opponent's campaign publications which falsely claim that
he is an incumbent and an opponent who legally changes his name to resemble that of the
candidate.
Fitting this theory into the campaign context would depend on the existence of a statute
prohibiting such behavior and a showing that the plaintiff is within the zone of interests
sought to be protected. For a discussion ofprivate causes of action for unethical campaign
conduct, see text accompanying notes 134-39 infra.
45. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 388-89 (1920). See
also, Survey of Recent Developments in IndianaLaw, 12 IND. L. Rv. 1, 110-11 (1979).
46. Baird v. National Health Foundation, 235 Mo. App. 594, 144, S.W.2d 850 (1940).
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individually against the association's members.47 In these jurisdictions, any judgment based upon vicarious liability against a
campaign committee could be enforced only against the campaign
fund and not the volunteer workers or staff. In cases in which
members of unincorporated associations are sued in their individual capacities, they generally can be held liable only to the extent
that they ratified, authorized, or participated in the alleged misconduct. 4 8 Thus, when the alleged tort is that of a member not
acting as an agent or servant of the association, other members
cannot be held accountable because they had no power to select,
control, or discharge the wrongdoer.49
On the other hand, if the member is acting as an agent or servant of the association, the general rule requiring liability when
there is ratification, participation, or authorization by the member
would apply with one possible addition: "Liability of a member
may exist without personal participation in the unlawful act of a
voluntary association if the member sets the proceedings in motion or agrees to a course of action which culminates in wrongful
conduct."50
Thus, in order to set this issue properly within the perspective
of the campaign structure, it is necessary to determine who the
members of the campaign organization are. In the typical voluntary unincorporated association, the question is easily answered;
however, in a campaign organization, it seems that many of those
connected with the campaign are more like employees than members. For instance, the average grass roots campaign worker, unlike the member of an association, has no voice in campaign
strategy and is not directly benefited by the campaign's objectives.
The extent of his ties to the campaign is minimal. He is given a
specific, often ministerial, task to perform. Those workers who
47. E.g., OHIO REv.CODE ANN. § 1745.02 (Page 1978).
48. E.g., Cousin v. Taylor, 115 Or. 472, 239 P. 96 (1925), where plaintiff sued officers
and members of a nonprofit unincorporated association on an employment contract. The
court held that although an unincorporated association may not be sued in the absence of a
statute granting such capacity, its members and officers may nevertheless be sued individually where they assumed to act for a principal which had no legal existence.
49. Thus, in Guy v. Donald, 203 U.S. 399 (1906), in discussing the liability of members of a voluntary river-pilot association for the torts of another member, the Court saidIf we imagine such a pilot performing his duties within sight of the assembled
association, he still would be sole master of his course. If all his fellows passed a
vote on the spot that he should change and shouted it through a speaking trumpet, he would owe no duty to obey, but would be as free as before to do what he
thought best.
Id. at 407.
50. Feldman v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 1943).
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have a greater voice in the policymaking and practical operations
of the campaign may, by contrast, more closely approximate the
role of a typical association member.
Thus, the voluntary worker is set apart from the member by
virtue of the member's interest in the goals and activities of the
association in addition to the power to effect changes in campaign
organization and strategy. This distinction is supported by cases
which discuss member liability. They indicate that a member will
be held vicariously liable for the acts of another member or employee of the association when the member acts in an "employerlike manner." Authorization, ratification, and initiation of enterprise activities constitute attributes of employers. 5 1 Thus, the voluntary campaign worker's lack of employer-like qualities,
especially when considered in light of the traditional justifications
for vicarious liability, leads one to conclude that it would be inappropriate to hold the vast majority of campaign workers liable for
the tortious acts of their coworkers.52
The campaign structure, however, includes different levels of
workers. At some point along this continuum, a campaign worker
may cross the line between employee and member. Consequently,
it may be fair to hold some campaign workers liable under the
doctrine of vicarious liability when they have sufficiently participated in, ratified, authorized, or set in motion the wrongful act.53
C. PersonalLiability of the Candidate
It would be difficult to justify the membership theory of vicarious liability if it were possible for the candidate himself to be
more insulated from liability for personally authorized staff activities than the protection afforded members of the staff who actually
51. Eg., Guy v. Donald, 203 U.S. 399 (1906), in which Justice Holmes held that a
member of an unincorporated association cannot be held liable for the actions of another

member or servant of the association if he did not have the right or opportunity to select,
control, or discharge the tortfeasor; Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers of America, 380 Pa. 3,
109 A.2d 815 (1954), where the court held for the defendant labor union officers on the

grounds that direct participation in, or express authorization or planning of, the wrongful
acts must be alleged in order to establish liability on such a membership theory.

52. Smith, supra note 18. The grassroots campaign worker has no control over the
employment or supervision of the volunteers. Such a worker receives no benefit from the
operation of the campaign organization, except a psychological one which is probably not
sufficiently strong to justify imposing vicarious liability. Further, these workers are not in
the best position to avoid losses, nor are their pockets sufficiently deep to satisfy damage
judgments.
53. Eg., Feldman v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 266 (4th Cir.
1943).
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performed the activities. The candidate is, in reality, a "supermember" of the association because he possesses all of the employer-like attributes required for the imposition of vicarious liability.54 The candidate also derives the ultimate benefit of a
successful campaign and should be, at least in theory, the one best
suited to bear responsibility for the tortious activities of his workers. Thus, blanket immunity from legal action should not be afforded the candidate-particularly not where the wrongful
conduct at issue was ratified, authorized, or set in motion by the
candidate, or where the candidate participated in the conduct.
This conclusion does not, however, lead to the conclusion that
the candidate should be personally subject to the liability flowing
from respondeat superior in all instances in which a third party is
harmed. Imposition of vicarious liability requires a closer examination of the traditional justifications for respondeat superior
based on an enterprise or entrepreneurial theory.55 These justifications fall short of providing a sound basis for applying respondeat superior to the political candidate.56
First, support of such an extension of vicarious liability may
be found in the principle that one employs a substitute at one's
own peril.57 Although this justification carries some emotional
appeal, it is clear that merely placing an employee in a position in
which he-may cause injury has not received widespread support as
a basis for imposing liability on respondeat superior principles.5"
Second, it might be argued that the candidate, as leader of the
campaign organization, is in the best position to control the acts of
the volunteer and, thus, to prevent the injury. 9 But, a political
candidate is not precisely a typical entrepreneur; his organization
is a loose one of temporary duration and his campaign workers
are chosen more for their availability and enthusiasm than for any
special skills. Of necessity, no sophisticated personnel departments or screening procedures exist. Further, campaign expenditure statutes may limit the amounts that such candidates may
54. In certain circumstances, the candidate may, as a practical matter, fall under the

ultimate control of his political party. In these cases, a reexamination of the candidate's
employer-like qualities is required to determine whether he is a member of the organiza-

tion and accordingly liable.
55. This theory focuses on who runs the enterprise rather than on acts of participation,

ratification, and authorization. See text accompanying notes 11-23 supra.
56. See text accompanying notes 24-34 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
58. Note, supra note 20.

59. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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contribute to their own causes, thus limiting the candidate's ability
to control his workers directly. If a candidate cannot add personal
funds to his campaign fund, then one of the justifications for vicarious liability has been partially defeated. Vicarious liability
should act to encourage an employer to improve his training and
supervision procedures in order to operate a safer venture. Statutes which limit the funds available for these purposes make it less
likely that such care will be taken.
Third, it might be argued that the candidate receives the benefit of this enterprise and thus should not escape its burdens.6 °
Clearly, a benefit is derived, although not in the usual form of
profit.6 ' However, this justification proves too much-including a
range of actions too wide to be logically justified. If benefit were
to be the sole test, liability would be imposed for all injuries connected in any way with the enterprise, as long as the party being
sued has received a benefit.
Finally, the deep pocket or loss spreading rationale might be
advanced as a justification for extending vicarious liability to the
political candidate. There is, however, no reason to expect that a
candidate's pockets are deep. Additionally, since he is not engaged in a business with a product to sell, he cannot distribute the
losses over a class of consumers who might buy his product. Even
if contributors are analogous to consumers, these contributions go
not to the candidate personally, but to his campaign treasury,
which is in the control of his committee.62
Thus, the reasons for vicarious imposition of personalliability
upon a political candidate are not compelling. Indeed, imposing
personal vicarious liability on candidates may drive poorer candidates from the political arena and even inhibit some campaigners
from exercising the full breadth of their legitimate speech and associational rights.
Therefore, a closer analysis of the structural elements of a political campaign is necessary. To this end, the following section
examines the traditional elements of respondeat superior in the
context of relationships between a volunteer worker and campaign
committees, their members, and political candidates in an attempt
60. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
61. E.g., Malloy v. Fong, 37 Ca2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Helms v. Hanke, 5
Wis.2d 465, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958). Both cases apply respondeat superior although the
benefits received by the employer were services gratuitously performed instead of profit as
such.
62. See 2 U.S.C. § 432(b) (Supp. 1976).
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to determine the extent to which vicarious liability is applicable to
this facet of the electoral process.
III. THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
The minimal requirement for any application of respondeat
superior is the existence of a master-servant relationship. There
are three requisite elements underlying this relationship:63 (1) the
master must assent to the relationship;' (2) the master must expect to derive some benefit from the relationship;65 and, (3) the
master must have the right to control the actions of the servant.6
Only in rare instances will a political candidate expressly assent to the employment of each individual worker. He does, however, implicitly assent to his campaign committee, the campaign
itself, the random method of recruiting, and, perhaps, even inadequate supervision of campaign workers. The candidate should
also know that untrained or poorly trained volunteer workers will
be assigned to perform various ministerial tasks. Yet it is arguable
that the candidate is so far removed from the daily operations of
the campaign that any such constructive assent amounts to an unrealistic fiction which is wholly inappropriate in the context of a
modem, large-scale political campaign. On the other hand, the
candidate is in the same position as the president of a large corporation who is held to have assented to the acts of his employees. 67
The benefit element of the master-servant relationship is satisfied in the campaign context. The primary purpose for hiring
campaign workers is to secure the candidate's election. Although
these workers may also have personal motivations, the ultimate
63. A. CONARD, R. KNAUSS & S. SIEGEL, AGENCY, ASSOCIATIONS, EMPLOYMENT,
LICENSING, AND PARTNERSHIPS

104-06 (2d ed. 1977).

64. Eg., Galvan v. Peters, 22 Wis.2d 598, 126 N.W.2d 590 (1964) (no employment
relationship found when a volunteer performed a task without the church's knowledge or
assent and without fulfilling any legal obligation of the church).
65. Eg., Dill v. Rader, 533 P.2d 650 (Okla. 1975). Contra,Van Drake v. Thomas, 110
Ind. App. 586, 38 N.E.2d 878 (1942) (suggesting that the test for the existence of an employment relationship is not benefit but "power of control." Id. at 882). Accord, Hall v. Smith,
2 Bing. 156 (1824) (holding that he who derives an advantage from an act which is done by
another must answer for any injury which a third person may sustain from that act. Id. at

160).
66. E.g., Arsand v. City of Franklin, 83 Wis. 2d 40, 264 N.W.2d 579 (1978).
67. Neither the president of the large corporation nor the candidate assents to the
hiring of lower level workers. Both, however, have ultimate control over the mechanism
that makes such decisions.
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benefit accrues to the candidate.68
The most difficult element of the master-servant relationship
to establish in a campaign context is the master's right to control
the activities of the servant. Generally, the unconditional right to
unilaterally terminate the relationship by firing the worker is sufficient to establish the right to control.6 9 There is also support for
the view that this right must include the power to direct authoritatively the activities of the worker rather than to make mere suggestions.70 While the right to discharge a worker may represent
the right to control a worker, there are generally no employment
contracts between a candidate and his campaign personnel. Thus,
it may not be technically possible to fire such workers. There is,
however, support for the view that a right to sever even gratuitous
or nonbinding relationships constitutes control.71
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the candidateworker relationship arguably satisfies the minimum requirements
of assent, benefit, and control which underlie the master-servant
relationship and thereby justifies the application of the doctrine of
respondeat superior. Political campaigns, however, are generally
staffed by a greater number of volunteer workers than paid workers. In assessing the possible imposition of vicarious liability for
the wrongs of volunteers, it is necessary to determine whether a
volunteer may be classified as a servant, and, if so, to establish the
bounds of a volunteer's scope of employment.
Case law provides few rules for determining the extent to
68. For a discussion of the campaign worker's personal motivations for joining the
campaign, see text accompanying notes 75-93 infra.
69. Eg., Williams v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 146 Cal. App. 2d 322, 326, 304 P.2d 141, 144
(1956); Bevan v. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 668, 683,
294 P.2d 524, 533 (1956); MacKenzie v. Neale Constr. Co., 75 Wyo. 175, 188, 294 P.2d 355,
359 (1956). Cf. Van Drake v. Thomas, 110 Ind. App. 586, 38 N.E.2d 878 (1942) (establish-

ing the unconditional right to terminate the employment relationship as a significant evidentiary factor with respect to right of control).
70. Eg., Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909). The court in Singer Mfg.
Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 518 (1889) held that the right to control is "the right to direct the
manner in which the business shall be done, as well as the result to be accomplished, or, in

other words, 'not only what shall be done, but how it shall be done."' Id. at 523 (quoting
Railroad Co. v. Hanning, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 649, 656 (1886).
71. E.g., Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Moore v. El Paso
Chamber of Commerce, 220 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. 1949), in which the court said:

The relation ...

does not depend upon an express appointment and acceptance

thereof, but may be, and frequently is, implied from the words and conduct of the
parties and the circumstances of the particular case. It may be implied from a

single transaction... that [if] there was at least an implied intention to create the
obligation, it will by implication be held to exist.
Id. at 331.
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which voluntary workers may be considered employees for purposes of respondeat superior. Most cases hold that compensation
is not fundamental to the creation of an employment relationship.72 Other cases suggest that the employer's right to control the
activities of workers is a sufficient ground to include volunteers as
employees for the purpose of imposing vicarious liability.73 Another group of cases maintains that the assent of and benefit to the
employer are the only necessary factors.7 4 Thus, by and large,
volunteers are not wholly excluded from the employment relationship, provided that some combination of the three prerequisites of
assent, benefit, and control are present.
IV.

SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT

If an employment relationship can exist between a candidate
and his volunteer workers, and if no substantial constitutional or
policy considerations militate against the extension of vicarious
liability to a campaign context,75 then it is essential that the concept of scope of employment be defined with regard to volunteers.
The courts will apply respondeat superior only if the tort was
72. E.g., Lowry v. Kneeland, 263 Minn. 537, 117 N.W.2d 207 (1962). While there are
some cases which indicate that compensation might be essential to an employment relationship, these cases generally present the issue in a different context. For instance, one
line of cases concerns volunteers who were injured by other volunteers while performing
gratuitous services. E.g., Haugen v. Central Lutheran Church, 58 Wash. 2d 166, 361 P.2d
637 (1961) (holding that the plaintiff-volunteer was not an employee but a business invitee
because there was no express or implied contract of employment. Interestingly enough,
this theory was used to establish the church's liability for the torts of its servants. The court
seems to have raised the distinction between employees and business invitees in order to
avoid application of the master-servant rule.
Another line of cases involves workers who were not under contract and who received
no pay, but who were suing their "employers" under various workmen's compensation
statutes. The courts held thatfor the purposes of such statutes these plaintiffs were not
employees. Eg., Reeder v. Pincolini, 59 Nev. 396, 94 P.2d 1097 (1939); Jylha v. Chamberlain, 168 Or. 171, 121 P.2d 928 (1942).
73. Eg., Fernquist v. San Francisco Presbytery, 152 Cal. App. 2d 405, 313 P.2d 192
(1957). In Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal. 2d 622, 248 P.2d 922 (1952), the court, speaking
through Justice Traynor, held that the
primary test for determining whether a person performing gratuitous services for
another does so as the latter's agent is the same as that applied to determine
whether one performing services for compensation does so as an employee or as
an independent contractor, and in both situations the determinative issue is
whether or not the alleged principal controlled or had the legal right to control
the activities of the alleged agent.
Id. at 628, 248 P.2d at 925.
74. Eg., Scott v. Min-Aqua Bats Water Ski Club, Inc., 79 Wis. 2d 316, 255 N.W.2d
536 (1977); Galvan v. Peters, 22 Wis. 2d 598, 126 N.W.2d 590 (1964).
75. For a discussion of the impact of vicarious liability on the campaign context on
freedom of speech and association, see notes 94-122 infra and accompanying text.
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committed within the scope of the servants' employment. Scope
of employment is, in turn, defined by case law, various statutes
within any given jurisdiction and by policy considerations.
In determining the proper scope of employment, a court will
consider the justifications for vicarious liability. For instance, a
court which believes that the justification for vicarious liability is
that one employs a substitute at one's own peril may be more
likely to establish a narrower scope of employment test than a
court which accepts the deep pocket theory. The same court
would be likely to establish a much broader scope than a court
which requires both benefit and right to control.76
The servant's scope of employment is limited by other policy
considerations. For example, the courts in some jurisdictions have
indicated that different standards of vicarious liability should apply to nonprofit social or political organizations than those which
apply to businesses organized for profit." Similarly, most states
have, in the past, held that charitable institutions were immune
from liability for the torts of their servants.78 Thus, the doctrine
of respondeat superior will operate differently in every jurisdiction, depending on the court's concept of the limiting principle of
scope of employment.
The nature of the employee's tort also bears on the proper
scope of employment. Courts have traditionally been reluctant to
attribute the intentional torts of employees to employers.79 One
widely recognized test for imposing liability is to determine the
motive behind the employee's action-more specifically, to determine whose purposes were intended to be furthered by the action.
If the employee, intending to serve his master, entered into a tortious course of conduct, it is likely that his master would be re76. See notes 11-62 supra and accompanying text.
77. See, ag., Lyons v. American Legion Post 650 Realty Co., 172 Ohio St. 331, 175
N.E.2d 733 (1961).
78. See C.

GREGORY, H. KALVEN

& R. EPSTEIN, CASES

AND MATERIALS ON TORTS

750 (3d ed. 1977).
79. Lange v. B. & P. Motor Express, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
The prevailing opinion not many years ago narrowly restricted the scope of a
man's employment to include those things which his employer directed him to do,
and no others. Since it was presumed that an employer would never direct the
doing of an intentional tort, either expressly or impliedly, then such acts were not
considered a part of the employment. While it is true that the term "scope of
employment" is interpreted more liberally today to include a number of intentional torts, the fact remains that historically employer liability in this area is
uncertain, if not absent altogether.
Id. at 322-23 (footnotes omitted).
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sponsible for the resulting injury to a third party.80 Courts have
applied this test to deny recovery based on vicarious liability when
a servant negligently started a fire while smoking on the job,8 1 an
employee of an apartment house owner gained access to a woman's apartment on the pretense of inspecting the premises and
subsequently raped her,8 and a delivery man assaulted a woman
customer after making his delivery.83
Under a strict, motive-oriented theory of scope of employment, vicarious liability is unlikely to attach to a candidate or
campaign committee in a situation in which, for example, the volunteer worker becomes embroiled in a heated argument resulting
in harm to a member of the public. Implying a motive to further
the interests of the candidate would be inapt in this situation.
However, liability could be imposed on the employer if the worker
did not become personally angered in the discussion, but rather
became so animated and demonstrative in making his point that
he accidentally struck the individual with whom he was speaking.
It is also unlikely that this theory would be applicable to a situation in which the worker, after completing his task of soliciting
door-to-door contributions, assaulted a donor. Similarly, vicarious liability would not apply in an action for trespass if a worker
became tired and lay down in a third party's car.
A different line of cases imposes liability on the employer by
incorporating the scope of employment test into the motive-limitation theory. 84 This modification results in liability if the employee
80. "The master's responsibility cannot be extended beyond the limits of the master's
work. If the servant is doing his own work or that of some other, the master is not answerable for his negligence in the performance of it." Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S.
215, 221 (1909).
81. Herr v. Simplex Paper Box Corp., 330 Pa. 129, 130, 198 A. 309, 310 (1938).
82. Grimes v. B.F. Saul Co., 47 F.2d 409, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
83. Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C. 1951) (holding that since the assault
took place after the delivery and payment were both completed, it had no connection with
any motive to further the employer's business). Similar reasoning was used in Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Hill, 67 F.2d 487, 488 (5th Cir. 1933), a case in which an assault took
place on business premises but had no motivational connection with the employee's duties.
Both cases indicate that had there been some connection with the employer's business,
liability would have attached.
84. In Maple v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 30 Ohio Op.2d 471,201 N.E.2d 299
(1963), the court held that the defendant's employee was acting within his scope of employment when he injured the plaintiff by helping the latter move his stalled car which was
blocking the defendant company's driveway. In Nelson v. American West African Line, 86
F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1936), an intoxicated boatswain ordered the plaintiffseaman to "get up,
you big son of a bitch, and turn to," just before severely beating the plaintiff. The court
held that the boatswain was acting within the scope of his employment because his order to
"turn to" indicated a partial intent to further his employer's business. Id. at 732.
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exceeds his authority or commits an intentional tort when the act
is incidental to and in furtherance of the employer's business.8 5
Thus, if a door-to-door canvasser refused to vacate a resident's
premises upon request and blocked the door with his foot in order
to complete his memorized campaign harangue, vicarious liability
would attach to the employer. The worker's actions were
prompted-at least partially-by a motive to effectuate the candidate's or campaign committee's business, and therefore, the volunteer was acting within the scope of his employment. Similarly, a
campaign worker who had both personal and campaign-based
motives for engaging in speech which results in an action for defaif his
mation would be acting within the scope of his employment
86
apparent.
sufficiently
were
motive
campaign-related
According to another formulation of the scope of employment
limitation:
A master is subject to liability for the intended tortious harm by
a servant to the person or things of another by an act done in
conjunction with the servant's employment, although the act
was unauthorized, if the act was not unexpectable in view of
the duties of the servant.87
Thus, if a volunteer is responsible for spreading derogatory comments about the opposing candidate without violating the libel
and slander provisions, it is arguably "not unexpectable in view of
the duties" that he might engage in statutorily prohibited, unethical campaign speech, such as racial or ethnic slurs.88
In contrast to this "foreseeability" standard, certain cases demand a closer connection between the employee's tortious conduct and his employment duties.8 9 These cases turn on the
85. E.g., Dill v. Rader, 533 P.2d 650 (Okla. 1975).
86. For a discussion of the necessary elements for a defamation action in the campaign context, see text accompanying notes 125-30 infra.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 245 (1957). See also Note, supra note 20,
at 252. The author explains the Restatement's position in the context ofjobs which do not
require the use of force:
Such repossession often will meet with resistance, however, which in turn will be
likely to create anger on the part of all involved. Because of the likelihood that
unprivileged force will be used in such situations, the employer may be held liable, even though he did not specifically authorize the employee to use force, or
even though he instructed the employee not to use force.
Id. at 238.
88. For a discussion of statutes which define unethical campaign speech and conduct,
see text accompanying notes 134-39 infra.
89. E.g., New Jersey Steamboat Co. v. Brockett, 121 U.S. 637 (1887) (passenger in a
section of a boat which was off limits was severely beaten by the boat's watchman); Bjornquist v. Boston & A.R. Co., 250 F. 929 (1st Cir. 1918) (eight-year-old child was hitching a
ride on a moving car in the freightyard when a trainman yelled at him to "get off or I'll
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argument that if the employee is required, as part of his job, to use
force against third parties, excessive force should reasonably be
expected. These cases would cover "bouncers" in bars and private
bodyguards. Conversely, when force is not an element of the employee's task, it falls outside the scope of employment because its
use is not reasonably expected. Applying this standard to the
campaign context, a bodyguard charged with the responsibility of
protecting a candidate at political rallies would be justified in using excessive force in order to clear a path for the candidate to
walk through the crowd.
The most radical standard for determining scope of employment was established in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United
States.90 The rule in that case is that liability will be imposed if
the act was not unexpectable, irrespective of the duties of the servant, as long as the employment has a special connection with the
act done. 9 This test virtually eliminates foreseeability as a criterion for imposing liability. Instead, liability is premised on the
fact that the enterprise is responsible for putting the employee in a
situation in which he may cause some damage.92 This theory
would impose liability on the candidate in the political context if,
for example, a volunteer committed a tort while on his way to or
from campaign headquarters.93
These theories indicate the inherent difficulty in defining and
applying the doctrine of respondeat superior to both the typical
business enterprise and the political campaign organization. Even
if the principle of respondeat superior is extended to the area of
political campaigning, application of the doctrine will depend
upon each jurisdiction's attitude toward such issues as the employment relationship, the status of volunteers, and the scope of employment.
break your neck," after which the boy jumped and his legs were run over and severed by

the train wheels.)
90. 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968). A drunken sailor returning from shore leave turned
the control valves of a Brooklyn drydock causing both the drydock and a Coast Guard
vessel to partially sink. The United States government was held liable as the sailor's employer even though he was on short leave and his duties did not include the operation of a
dry dock.
91. Id. at 171-72.
92. Note, supra note 20, at 246-47.

93. This theory has not enjoyed widespread application. Therefore, it is difficult to
predict its application to new situations. Indeed, Bushey may be partially explained by the
fact that the tortfeasor was in the navy and thus theoretically on duty at all times. It is also
relevant that the tortfeasor was in the general vicinity of his place of employment when he
committed the tort.
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ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE APPLICATION OF
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR IN THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN
CONTEXT

Even if there are adequate legal and policy justifications for
extending respondeat superior to political campaigning there are
constitutional arguments against such an extension.
A.

FirstAmendment Restraints

Extending vicarious liability to hold a candidate or his committee liable for the torts of his volunteer workers may operate as
an unreasonable restraint on the first amendment's guarantees of
freedom of speech and association. Prior restraints on first
amendment rights are traditionally difficult to justify.9 4 Any restriction on these freedoms bears a heavy presumption against its
validity.9" Although all prior restraints are not unconstitutional, it
is clear that they cannot
act as unconditional limitations upon
96
guaranteed freedoms.
At first glance, vicarious liability does not appear to be a prior
restraint, at least not in the traditional sense of the term, because it
does not operate as a condition precedent to the exercise of these
rights. Vicarious liability might, however, become a prior restraint if there was a concomitant requirement of mandatory campaign insurance or placing funds in escrow to cover damages in
vicarious liability suits. 97
94. E.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178 (1948).
95. E.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
96. See, eg., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), in which the Court stated
that "A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal
Constitution.. .. The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is
indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down."
Id. at 113.
97. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), is somewhat relevant in this context. The
Supreme Court in Buckley was presented with constitutional challenges to the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, as it was amended in 1974.
The challenged provisions stated that:
(a) individual political contributions are limited to $1,000 to any single candidate
per election, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor, independent expenditures by individuals and groups, relative to a clearly identified
candidate, are limited to $1,000 a year, campaign spending by candidates for various federal offices and spending for national conventions by political parties are
subject to prescribed limits; (b) contributions and expenditures above certain
threshold levels must be reported and publicly disclosed, (c) a system for public
funding of presidential campaign activities is established by subtitle H of the In-
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Perhaps more important than the validity or invalidity of prior
restraints is the concept that only restrictions on constitutionally
protected rights are invalid. Thus, prior restrictions or subsequent
punishments for the use of "fighting words" 98 or the use of the
mails in an attempt to defraud the public9 9 are valid because no
constitutionally protected right is infringed. Therefore, if damages were awarded for injuries stemming from speech-related incidents in political campaigning such as defamation or the use of
the mails for disseminating fraudulent campaign literature," e the
inposition of vicarious liability would not be limited by constitutional restraints. 10 1
Another theory which might prevent the imposition of vicarious liability in the campaign context is derived from the fear of a
ternal Revenue Code; and (d) a federal Election Commission is established to
administer and enforce the Act.
The net result of Buckley is that in the area of political campaigning, money has a direct
and substantial impact on speech. Restraints on the expenditure of campaign funds are, in
effect, restraints on the exercise of free speech. Wright, Politicsand the Constitution" Is
Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). Discussing the Court's holding in Buckley,
Judge Wright stated:
I am deeply concerned with the lesson the Court taught in the course of reaching
its result. Throughout its discussion of contributions and expenditures, the Court
persisted in treating the regulation of campaign monies as tantamount to the regulation of political expression. The Court told us, in effect, that money is speech.
Id. at 1005.
The impact of Buckley on the imposition of vicarious liability upon a political candidate is minimal. In Buckley, one of the express legislative purposes behind the invalidated
campaign expenditure provisions was the limitation of the scope of political campaigning.
The Court viewed it as a direct limitation upon the candidate's right to speak freely. 424
U.S. at 17, 39-59. Conversely, the purpose for extending vicarious liability to a campaign
organization and its members is not to restrain speech. Vicarious liability would be imposed only to redress the harm caused to an innocent third party. Any effect the application would have on free speech would be tangential to the primary purpose.
98. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (holding that the use
of the terms "damned Fascist" and "god-damned racketeer" was not constitutionally protected speech).
99. See Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178 (1948) (holding that freedom of
the press does not include the right to use the mails to conduct a deceptive advertising

campaign).
100. See text accompanying notes 134-39 infra.
101. Eg., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1951).
Assuming, however, that a constitutionally protected right is being violated, the restraint may be held invalid even though not formally enforceable and though its adverse
effect upon the exercise of the right is not great. Eg., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 53, 66-67 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
If the restraint were smaller than it is, it is from petty tyrannies that large ones
take root and grow. This fact can be no more plain than when they are imposed
on the most basic rights of all. Seedlings planted in that soil grow great and,
growing, break down the foundations of liberty.
Id. at 543.
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severe "chilling effect" on the first amendment fights of those involved in the campaign.10 2 For example, the court in Franchise
Real y Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive
Boardof Culinary Workers 0 3 carved out a limited immunity from
liability for the alleged abuse of the lobbying process. In considering the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint, the court noted
that
[i]n any case, whether antitrust or something else, where a
plaintiff seeks damages or injunctive relief, or both, for conduct
which is prima facie protected by the First Amendment, the
danger that the mere pendency of the action will chill the exercise of First Amendment rights requires more specific allegations than would otherwise be required1 °4

This would not, however, be the case, indicated the court, if
the defendant's actions were not an exercise of first amendment
rights '05 or if the actions infringed upon the plaintiffs first amendment rights.10 6 Thus, it may be that the chilling effect theory
would not prohibit imposition of vicarious liability for torts such
as falsely attributed campaign literature, libel, or slander. Similarly, actions based upon invasion of privacy would be sustained
on the theory that the plaintiffs constitutionally protected rights
were violated by the defendant's actions, thus offsetting the concern for the chilling effect that vicarious liability would have on
the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights.
The extent of the court's holding in Franchise Realty is unclear. The court held only that the defendant's lobbying activities,
as alleged in the complaint, did not demonstrate sufficient grounds
for a cause of action for unfair competition. 0 7 The court did not,
however, conclude that lobbying with a wrongful purpose is, without more, an actionable offense.
102. See text accompanying notes 134-39 infra.
103. 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976). In FranchiseRealty the plaintiff sought treble damages under the Sherman Act alleging unfair competitive practices of the defendant's lobbying efforts against the issuance of restaurant construction permits by the city of San
Francisco. In dismissing the complaint, the court indicated that such complaints must allege specific violations when the effect of litigation would be to chill the defendant's first
amendment rights. Id. at 1082.
104. Id. at 1082-83.
105. The court indicated that had the defendant's actions been designed solely to harm
the plaintiff and not to secure a given course of conduct from the government, then such
"lobbying" would not enjoy immunity. Id. at 1081.
106. For example, the court said that the defendant's actions could have prevented the
plaintiff from gaining access to the construction permits board to present its side of the
issue. Id.
107. Id. at 1083.
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The court did note that a mere claim that lobbying had been
used to gain a business advantage would not be an adequate allegation. 18 Indeed, such a purpose-to influence legislation-is legitimate.
It is inevitable, whenever an attempt is made to influence legislation by a campaign of publicity, that an incidental effect of
that campaign may be the infliction of some direct injury upon
the interests of the party against whom the campaign is directed. And it seems equally inevitable that those conducting
the campaign would be aware of, and possibly even pleased by,
the prospect of such injury. To hold that the knowing infliction
of such injury renders the campaign itself illegal would thus be
tantamount to outlawing all such campaigns.0 9
Finally, the court emphasized that its decision was influenced
by the plaintiffs prayer for damages of $11,100,000.110 The court
pointedly noted that notice-pleading and liberal federal discovery
rules, coupled with potentially huge damage awards, would provide "a most potent weapon to deter the exercise of First Amendment rights."' 11
The chilling effect rationale will probably not serve to block
third party tort actions in the political campaign context." 2 Extending vicarious liability to political campaigning would not be
"tantamount to outlawing all such campaigns."' 1 3 As long as the
apparent purpose of a vicarious liability action is not vexatiously
to chill the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights, the application of the chilling effect rational is inapposite.
In order to determine the validity of a restriction on first
amendment rights, courts will balance the public interest in having the restriction, the value of the unrestricted right, and the reasonableness of the restraint. First, the restriction must be based
on a legitimate public interest. Legitimate interests include protecting the public from undue noise caused by the use of loudspeakers on trucks, 1 4 determining the community's zoning
108. Id. at 1080.
109. Id. (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365

U.S. 127, 143-44 (1961)).
110. 542 F.2d at 1082.

111. Id.
112. However, it is not difficult to envision circumstances in which the chilling effect
rationale might have some cogency within the political arena. For instance, if a candidate
were to sue his political opponent on questionable grounds, demanding huge damages and
seeking broad discovery concerning his opponent's campaign organization and practices, a
court might invoke a chilling-effect theory to deny recovery.
113. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
114. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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requirements for commercial property,1 ' 5 protecting the privacy of
individuals in their homes from door-to-door canvassers, 1 6 and
maintaining order on state fairgrounds.1 17 The public interest behind imposition of vicarious liability on the political candidate or
committee for the torts of campaign workers is to redress recognizable wrongs and to deter similar conduct in the future. These
twin aims have long been considered substantial public interests.
Second, the restriction in question must be both narrow and
unburdensome. For instance, statutes which prohibit all door-todoor canvassing are invalid because their scope is broader than
that which, given the public interest sought to be protected, is necessary. 1 8 Courts will, for example, differentiate between statutes
which regulate commercial canvassing and those which regulate
political, social, or religious canvassing'

19

because commercial

speech traditionally has not received the same degree of protection as political expression.120 If there is a less burdensome means
12
of protecting the same interest, that means must be utilized. 1
It is arguable that the least burdensome method of protecting
the public from tortious harm done by campaign workers is to
impose liability only on the workers themselves. 122 However,
both the candidate and his committee may be in a better position
to oversee the campaign structure and develop new procedural
safeguards against harm to third parties. Thus, imposing vicarious liability on either of these parties would more effectively pro115. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).

116. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976). The Hnes court, while recognizing the legitimate interest in protecting privacy interests from the actions of door-to-door
canvassers, voided the challenged ordinance for vagueness. Id. at 620.

117. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414
(S.D. Ohio 1977).
118. Love v. Mayor of Cheyenne, 448 F. Supp. 128 (D. Wyo. 1978).
119. Eg., Citizens for a Better Environment v. City of Park Ridge, 567 F.2d 689, 692

(7th Cir. 1975). Political or religious canvassing is not, of course, immune from all regulation but only from blanket prohibitions or other unreasonable restrictions.
120. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
121. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). In invalidating an ordinance

which imposed a blanket prohibition on door-to-door canvassing, the Court noted that
freedom of speech involves not only the right to speak but the right to hear and to receive

information. The court held that a less burdensome restriction, which would prohibit such
canvassing only if the property owner had posted notice that he does not want such intru-

sions, could afford the necessary protection. Id. at 147-48.
122. This argument has not appeared in cases which impose vicarious liability upon
charitable institutions such as churches which could be challenged as an undue restriction
upon the freedom of religion protected by the first amendment. Eg., Malloy v. Fong, 37
Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Haugen v. Central Lutheran Church, 58 Wash. 2d 166,
361 P.2d 637 (1961).
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tect the public by providing a financially responsible source of
redress for past wrongs, by deterring future tortious conduct, and
by providing incentive to the campaign to institute safety procedures.
B. PracticalRestraints
The imposition of vicarious liability may have other undesirable effects on political campaigning. For instance, it is arguable
that the mere filing of large personal injury claims coupled with
claims for punitive damages prior to an election could seriously
damage or even terminate a candidate's campaign. Although
most claims would probably be trespass or minor personal injury
actions, the possibility of large damage claims is equally possible.
This problem might be alleviated in part by requiring the plaintiff
to post a bond or pay the costs of the litigation if he fails to establish his claim-particularly if he is the candidate's opponent. Further, damages, attorney's fees, and court costs would ultimately
have to be paid by the candidate or his campaign organization. In
light of the inability to pass these costs along to consumers, as
business organizations do,123 the ultimate desirability of extending
vicarious liability to the political campaign may depend on the
availability of insurance, its costs, and the candidate's or committee's ability to bear this burden.
VI.

CONCLUSION:

CONDUCT TO WHICH VICARIOUS LIABILITY

SHOULD ATTACH

Assuming that vicarious liability may attach to the campaign
organization, this final analysis must define that type of conduct
which will trigger the imposition of liability.
Perhaps the most frequent causes of action which occur whenever any group has widespread contact with the public are negligence, assault and battery, and trespass. Door-to-door canvassing
and crowded political rallies are two common functions of the political campaign which readily lend themselves to both negligent
and intentional infliction of harm by campaign workers.124 The
one restriction on the imposition of vicarious liability in this context is, as earlier discussed,125 that the servant must be acting
123. See text accompanying notes 30-62 supra.
124. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 75-93 supra.
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1 26
within the scope of employment when the harm is inflicted.
A second type of harm to which vicarious liability should be
extended is inflicted on public figures. Public figures have a right
of privacy which is more circumscribed than that of the average
person.1 27 The public figure's right to privacy is, for example, not
violated by publication of news or material which is informative
or educational. 2 8 However, the public figure is not absolutely
barred from bringing suit when he is the subject of publicity. Although a "factually accurate public disclosure is not tortious when
connected with a newsworthy event even though offensive to ordinary sensibilities," 12 9 a nondefamatory statement putting the public figure in a false light is actionable.1 3° Thus, a candidate could

subject himself to vicarious liability by allowing his campaign
workers to distribute completely unnewsworthy personal information about his opponent which is not informational or educational
material or which places his opponent in a false light.

Wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping pose special privacy problems for which there is a common law remedy.13 1 This
is one area of privacy law in which the scope of allowable intru13 2
sion is not dependent upon the public nature of its victim.
Thus, although a public figure waives a certain degree of privacy
because his activities are of public interest, his home and office
remain protected against wiretapping and eavesdropping. The
political candidate may reasonably expect to retain his privacy in
each of these places. Consequently, a candidate who authorizes
126. Political discussion is typically heated. It can lead to arguments and perhaps violence. One significant question is whether a volunteer is acting within the scope of his
employment when he strikes a member of the public during the course of a political debate.
On one hand, a strong personal motive is obvious. On the other hand, the nature of the
duties assigned to such a worker might foreseeably result in violence.
127. Public figures consist of those individuals who "achieve such pervasive fame or
notoriety that [they become].., public figure[s] for all purposes and in all contexts" and
individuals who "voluntarily [inject themselves] or [are] drawn into a particular controversy and thereby [become].. .public figure[s] for a limited range of issues." Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 328 (1974).
128. Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). However, the initial questions are: who is a public figure and what constitutes a public event.
Further, voluntary and involuntary public figures are treated differently; the latter receive
more protection. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976).
129. Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858, 861 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
130. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652E (1976).
131. E.g., Fowler v. Southern Bell TeL & Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1965).
132. See also Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (uninvited intrusion does not have to be followed by publication in order to be actionable; the harm lies in
the intrusion itself).
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electronic surveillance of his opponent's home, office, or campaign
line between allowable surheadquarters, is probably crossing 1the
33
veillance and invasion of privacy.
Campaigns, indeed, engender a variety of wrongful acts for
which a candidate may be held vicariously liable. These activities
reflect unethical campaign conduct which is statutorily proscribed
and characterized by its ability to taint the political process.
Many states, for instance, have statutes prohibiting the publication
of anonymous campaign literature.134 Hawaii imposes sanctions
for falsely attributed candidate withdrawal statements. 135 Other
state statutes make it unlawful for candidates to falsify their own
qualifications. 36 New York bans certain types of derogatory
statements made about one's opponent. 137 Finally, certain provisions impose sanctions when "dirty tricks" are committed. 138
These statutes are designed to protect the integrity of political
elections and to perpetuate a more reasonable utilization of the
right to vote.
These provisions are all statutorily defined prohibitions which
have no common law counterparts. Each imposes criminal sanctions as well as fines. They do not, however, specifically provide
for private civil actions. If a private cause of action could be inferred from the statutes, then vicarious liability could be extended
to cover both the criminal causes of action and the civil claims. It
is arguable that the impact of civil liability would be so great that
it would require legislative formulation. Yet, implied private
causes of action have been found in other areas of the law in the
absence of specific statutory provisions. 39 Regardless of whether
133. This issue poses an interesting problem. Suppose that a campaign committee hires
a private detective with general instructions to uncover some "dirt" on a political opponent.
To do so, the investigator wiretaps the latter's office. Is the detective an employee or an
independent contractor? Has the committee--or the candidate himself--set the tort in motion? Similar questions could arise if an advertising agency hired by the candidate or committee commits a tort.
134. See Detelopments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1111, 1286-87 (1975).
135. HAW. REv. STAT. § 19-3(6) (1976).
136. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 43 (1975) (misleading use of the word
"veteran" in candidate circulars, placards, etc., is prohibited); OR. REV. STAT. § 260.542
(1977) (prohibiting misleading use of term "re-elect" by candidate).
137. E.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW APP. § 5201.1 (McKinney 1978).
138. Id.
139. In securities law, for instance, private causes of action have been allowed by
courts. This arises when the plaintiff is within the zone of interests sought to be protected
by the statute and when Congress has failed to make adequate provision for the statute's
enforcement. Recently, however, courts have displayed a general reluctance to imply private causes of action. See generally, Note, Towards the Development ofan ImpliedRFght of
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a civil cause of action would stand, vicarious liability should be
available for the express criminal sanctions.
In conclusion, it may be that the application of respondeat superior to the enterprise of political campaigning is an idea whose
time has not yet come. There are, at the very least, first amendment restrictions upon the use of vicarious liability in this context.
Yet the policy justifications for imposition of the doctrine-in particular, the need to protect the public against tortious politicking-require limited application of respondeat superior to the
political campaign hierarchy. It is hoped that application of the
limited personal liability set forth in this Note coupled with the
requirement that a campaign worker has acted within the scope of
his employment when the tort was committed can make campaign
organizations more accountable for their tortious behavior, while
concurrently avoiding overly severe effects on political campaigning as a valued democratic institution.
STEVEN
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